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EXECUTIVE SUMARY 
 
Main objectives of this report, as outcome of the research activities carried out in 
2008 and in previous years by the research network SENUF, are the following: 
1. To collect the experience of the European Countries in the field of Plant Life 
Management (PLIM) and Plant Life Extension (PLEX), seen as two crucial 
programs in safety and cost optimisation at operating plants 
2. To settle a model for PLIM also suitable to support a PLEX program, tailored 
to the European market 
3. To validate the proposed model against the European practice. 
 
The basic goal of PLIM, as it is defined in this research, is to satisfy requirements for 
safe, possibly long-term, supplies of electricity in an economically competitive way. 
The basic goal of the operating companies is to operate as long as economically 
reasonable from the safety point of view. PLIM is a management tool for doing that.  
Therefore PLIM is a system of programs and procedures developed in many 
Countries, with some differences due to the national framework, to satisfy safety 
requirements for safe operation and for power production in a competitive way in a 
time frame which is rational from both the technical and economical point of view. 
PLIM programs address both technical and economic issues, as well as knowledge 
management issues. 
 
This report makes reference to the first part of this study that was completed in 2007, 
when a PLIM model was proposed and validated at real Nuclear Power Plants. This 
report adds some important contributions in three areas: definition of the PLIM scope, 
review of the Ageing Management Program for selected structures, management of 
contractors and strategic alliances. These contributions were selected after a thorough 
analysis of the European best practice, also with the contribution of the SENUF 
network Members. 
 
The validation of the proposed PLIM model, including the improvements described in 
this report, represents only the first step of a more ambitious program of 
validation/improvement that will be implemented in the course of 2009. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the research 
 
In recent years the engineering community and the nuclear industry are living 
a "nuclear renaissance" time. At the same time, the effort to operate the existing 
reactors in a safe and cost effective mode, even in a long term perspective (such as in 
a framework for a Plant Life Extension Program), adds new challenges to old design 
and operation approaches. 
 
As a consequence, in last years many electric utilities and nuclear power 
plants adopted policies for improved coordination of both safety and non-safety 
programs, called plant life management (PLIM). Its implementation has followed 
many different approaches, being intrinsically dependent on the national regulatory 
framework and technical traditions. 
 
In Countries with some experience, the PLIM program proved very 
convenient, especially when coupled with Maintenance, Surveillance and Inspection 
(MS&I) optimization: average savings are reported in the range of 20-30% of total 
O&M (Operation and Maintenance) costs, especially in Central European Countries. 
The recent achievement of low production costs (16,8 USD/MWh) in 2007 and 92% 
capacity factor (in the USA) with no significant safety related event is considered a 
milestone in the nuclear industry, and a proof of the reliability and safety of the 
current plants, also thanks to the extensive application of PLIM techniques (in the 
USA they are mainly referred to the methodology described in the INPO AP-913 [1]). 
New challenges are ahead for the new reactors in the same fields: ageing management 
and operation control should be better integrated since the design phase, the large use 
of standard/unified projects will have to be localised to this concern, construction 
control and project management still poses serious unknown. 
 
The need for harmonised PLIM models at least at the European level (where 
the energy market is rather unified and regulated by general rules) has been recently 
raised, supported by two main reasons: 
• A reliable PLIM model needs to be supported by a consistent analysis of  
feedback from plant operation, which could be available only at over-national 
scale (only exceptions are the large nuclear energy suppliers); 
• Effective PLIM models need sharing of resources, suppliers, spare parts, 
O&M techniques among different plants, which therefore must have the same 
or very similar characteristics to foster such exchanges. 
 
The research for such a unified model focused on the four main components of 
a PLIM program/model, such as: 
1. Life Management of critical structures, systems and components (including 
ageing program, maintenance program, ISI, etc.); 
2. Long Term Investment plan; 
3. Long Term Operation and Personnel plan; 
4. Continuous safety upgrading of the plant. 
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 The SONIS/POS action, implemented at the JRC/IE since 2007, addressed the 
above mentioned issues and developed a number of research tasks in the field, which 
ended up in the issuing of a number of technical reports:  “Maintenance rules: 
improving maintenance effectiveness” [2], “Advanced Methods for Safety 
Assessment and Optimization of NPP Maintenance” [3] and “Optimization of 
Maintenance Programs at NPPs - Benchmarking study on implemented organizational 
Schemes, Advanced Methods and Strategies for Maintenance Optimization - 
Summary Report” [4]. These studies culminated with the first proposal for an 
integrated PLIM model contained in the report "A plant life management model 
including optimized MS&I program –Safety and economic issues" [5] issued in 2007. 
 
In the year 2008 the PLIM model proposed in 2007 was deeply revised and the 
areas of major concerns were re-developed on the basis of a detailed analysis of the 
EU state-of-the-art experience. Therefore, this report adds some important 
contributions to the 2007 model, in the following areas:  
• definition of the PLIM scope: informed selection of the SSCs covered by the  
PLIM program, at different levels; 
• review of the Ageing Management Program for selected structures, especially 
concrete structures, traditionally excluded by refined AMPs focussed on metal 
components; 
• contractor’s and strategic alliances management, with emphasis on work 
control, contractors' training and contract management.  
 
These contributions were selected from a thorough analysis of the European 
best practice, also with the contribution of the SENUF network Members.  
 
 According to the SONIS Work Program for the year 2008, this deliverable 
answers to the planning, as defined in the SONIS/POS 2008 Workplan [6] for 
deliverable 1.1a. 
 
 This deliverable also represents an outcome of the SENUF (Safety of 
European NUclear Facilities) network, Workpackage 3 (Benchmarking of optimized 
approaches to maintenance), according to the SENUF Workplan for 2008 [6]. 
 
The follow-up of the research, mainly based on validation and improvement of 
the proposed models, will take place in the years 2009 and 2010. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the research  
 
Main objectives of this report, as outcome of the research activities described 
above, are the following: 
1. To collect the experience of the European Countries in the field of PLIM and 
PLEX; 
2. To consolidate the PLIM model developed in 2007 [5], developing/improving 
those sections which showed difficulties in the application to real cases in the 
last benchmark exercise, such as the management models, to be adapted to the 
state-of-the-art practice (covering the large use of supplemental workers, set-
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up of networks for spare parts, etc.), the scoping process and the AMP for 
selected structures; 
3. To validate the proposed model against the European practice; 
4. To disseminate the developed models in the European engineering and 
research communities in order to get feedback and to encourage a widespread, 
coordinated improvement of the European practice. 
 
The next phase of the research (2009-2010) will improve the validation of the 
proposed model. 
 
1.3 Conduct of the research 
 
In the year 2008 the research on PLIM models and maintenance optimization 
schemes was conducted in three main steps, each containing important tasks, namely: 
 
A) Planning phase 
1. Coordinating with the SENUF network members, after the Steering 
Committee of May 2008 [6], in order to collect their experience in the field, 
planning the necessary tasks and the contributions. 
 
B) Research phase 
2. Development of Questionnaire on "Human behavior of contractors and staff in 
relation to maintenance and ISI", issued to all Utilities/Plants in Europe. 
Summary and analysis were carried out at the IE. 
3. Organizing, in cooperation with the IAEA and Inetec, an International 
Workshop on "Advanced Approaches to In-Service Inspection, Maintenance 
and Repair", hold in Zagreb at the INETEC premises, on May 4-9, 2008. The 
Workshop was attended by 15 experts from Russian Fed., Ukraine, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria. Lectures were delivered by four 
international experts, invited by the JRC (W.Daniels) and by the IAEA 
(J.J.Nicolais, M.Bolander, T.Batuecas, ), N. 8 Lectures were given by Inetec 
experts on advanced techniques and manipulators for ISI of the RPV, SG 
(including plugging) and other components of the primary system [7]. 
4. Organizing (and coordinating a Division), in cooperation with the 
OECD/NEA/CSNI WG on Concrete Ageing, a Workshop on "Ageing 
Management of Thick-Walled Concrete Structures, including In-Service 
Inspections, Maintenance and Repair, Instrumentation Methods and Safety 
Assessment in view of Long-Term Operation”, hosted by the Nuclear 
Research Institute Rez, on 30 September – 3 October, 2008. N.70 participants 
from 14 Countries (scientists and policy makers, involved in the field of 
nuclear safety, invited by the working Group of OECD/NEA on Concrete 
ageing) attended the Workshop, presenting 26 scientific papers + 3 keynote 
lectures [8]. 
5. Coordinating the Division for Plant Operation at the 2008 ASME Pressure 
Vessel and Piping Conference, Chicago, 27-31 July, 2008, where almost 500 
scientists and policy makers from all Countries attended the sessions [9] 
6. Organizing a Workshop on "Optimisation of maintenance programs at NPPs 
with consideration of safety and economical aspects" in Petten at the JRC on 
November 13-14, 2008. 20 experts from 9 Countries (6 New Members and 3 
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Neighboring Countries) attended the WS, two external experts were invited as 
speakers and 4 IE staff members contributed to the lectures [10] 
 
C) Validation Phase 
7. Validation of the proposed model with selected SENUF Members, on bilateral 
basis, during the whole 2008. 
1.4 Report content 
 
This report dedicates Chapter 2 to collect and summarize the European 
experience in relation to the PLIM and PLEX programs; Chapter 3 proposes a new 
approach to screening of the components in the framework of PLIM, while Chapter 4 
addresses Ageing Management issues for selected groups of components and Chapter 
5 covers some crucial management issues in relation to PLIM. 
Chapter 6 draws the conclusion of the research and sets the new drivers for the 
future steps. 
 
2 Background on PLIM and PLEX programs 
2.1 The PLIM program 
 
As better described in [5], the Plant Life Management (PLIM) problem was 
raised some years ago when it was clear that technological, safety, regulatory, human 
and economical issues had to be addressed at once in the overall management of the 
plant assets [4,11]. 
 
However, the PLIM models developed in recent years differ one from another 
because of the national frameworks and therefore a generalization sometimes appear 
difficult. 
Interesting attempts were carried out by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency with some technical documents and papers [11], to identify common drivers 
among the different national programs, but the discipline was never indeed regulated 
by binding documents to its Member States, by presenting commonly accepted 
principles, recognized by all the interested parties. Nevertheless, a large number of 
IAEA documents are available on basic safety concepts that could be relevant to life 
management programs [12-22]. 
 
In particular, a generic misunderstanding still survives in the engineering 
community among objectives and content of the different programs put in place in the 
different Countries which developed experience in the PLIM field. Programs such as 
License Renewal (LR), Long Term Operation (LTO), Plant Life Extension (PLEX), 
Periodic Safety Review (PSR), Ageing Management Program (AMP), etc. proved to 
share many technical tasks, but also to meet different objectives and to follow 
different regulatory frameworks.  
 
The JRC-IE spent some research efforts in last years in the clarification of the 
many issues addressed by the European Countries' programs and developed some 
unified models, which received very high consensus in many engineering 
communities and particularly in the research network of European Countries 
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interested to this discipline, SENUF [2,3,4,5]. A number of scientific papers were also 
published in order to foster the feedback from the engineering community [23]. 
 
As a result of this effort, a harmonized PLIM model could be developed. 
According to the EU experience, PLIM objectives can be summarized as in the 
following: 
 
• The basic goal of Plant Life Management (PLIM) is to satisfy requirements for 
safe long-term supplies of electricity in an economically competitive way. The 
basic goal of the operating company is to operate as long as economically 
reasonable from the safety point of view. PLIM is a management tool for 
doing that.  
• PLIM is a system of programmes and procedures developed in many 
Countries, with some differences due to the national framework, to satisfy 
safety requirements for safe operation and for power production in a 
competitive way in a time frame which is rational from both the technical and 
economical point of view. PLIM programmes address both technical and 
economic issues, as well as knowledge management issues. 
 
It has to be noted that PLIM should not be necessarily associated with the 
extension of operational life-time of the NPP. It represents an owner’s attitude and 
rational approach of the operating company to run the business economically and 
safely since the design stage and during the whole design life of the plant. 
In this framework some operational programs play the most crucial role, namely: 
• The ageing management program (AMP) 
• The maintenance, surveillance and inspection (MS&I) program  
• The knowledge management program (KM) 
• The asset management program  
• Major plant upgrading programs (if in place, such as power up-rating, 
modernisation, etc.) 
 
In particular, the AMP is a transversal program [5] cross-cutting maintenance, 
surveillance, and in service inspection programs and other operation related programs. 
It addresses ageing mechanisms prevention, control and consequence mitigation. The 
operating experience shows that active and short-lived SSC are in general addressed 
by existing maintenance programs. Conversely, the performance and safety margins 
of the passive long-lived SSC are assumed to be guaranteed by design. However, the 
analysis of the operating experience showed that unforeseen ageing phenomena may 
occur either because of shortcomings in design, manufacturing or by operating errors, 
calling for a refined, self-improving program.  
 
The maintenance program for a nuclear power plant covers all preventive and 
remedial measures that are necessary to detect and mitigate degradation of a 
functioning SSC or to restore to an acceptable level the performance of design 
functions of a failed SSC [13]. In this sense, the integration with surveillance and in-
service inspection is crucial, as the most advanced types of maintenance do integrate 
the three programs which have a common objective: to ensure that the plant is 
operated in accordance with the design assumptions and within the operational limit 
and conditions. Therefore in the following, MS&I will address all the three programs 
in an integrated form. 
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It is clear that the MS&I program is a crucial part of PLIM, being by far the 
main contributor to both operating costs (after operation) and operation planning. 
However, in order to support a PLIM framework, MS&I should have a specific list of 
attributes, making both safety assessment and cost optimization possible. These are 
the reasons why MS&I are deeply covered in this report and why the PLIM model 
strongly relies on specific assumptions in the field of MS&I. 
 
Knowledge Management and Asset Management are traditionally isolated 
programs from MS&I and AMP. PLIM recognizes the need for their integration and 
sets an overall optimization framework. 
 
 In many European Countries, PLIM is accompanied with a PSR program. The 
combination is not surprising, as PLIM is typically a utility driven program, while 
PSR is driven by the Safety Authority. Many technical tasks (those safety related) are 
similar, but objectives, time frame and regulatory implications are definitely different. 
 
 The relationship among PLIM and the other programs running at the NPPs is 
now quite clear in the EU Countries: well known programs such as component 
integrity, ageing management (AMP), life extension (PLEX), periodic Safety Review 
(PSR) and Plant Life Management (PLIM) are in fact well connected, but definitely 
not interchangeable. Despite of the different names, mostly derived from the national 
regulatory and engineering frameworks, there is a clear hierarchy among them. In 
particular, component integrity is a basic science dealing with the failure modes of the 
different components, their detection and their control. The AMP is an operational 
program in place at any NPP, which integrates maintenance, ISI and organisational 
issues aiming at controlling the component degradation. PLIM addresses safety as 
well as economics, knowledge management as well as decision making, and provides 
an overall framework to keep the whole plant in a safe and economically sustainable 
condition. 
 
 
2.2 The PLEX program 
 
Plant Life Extension (PLEX), often called Long Term Operation program 
(LTO), is a process often implemented in the nuclear Countries, due to the ageing of 
the plant fleets and the need to secure important energy sources combined with 
investment protection. 
 
A large number of technical documents is now available at the International 
Community on basic safety concepts that could be relevant to life extension 
programmes, and in particular on the requirements of the maintenance programmes in 
view of LTO programmes [5,15,16,19,20,21,22]. A clear position is common to many 
documents:  
 LTO is a programme that can be implemented only when the plant can 
demonstrate a suitable safety level in all its statuses; 
 The LTO programme are crucially based upon a strong integration of 
many existing programmes at the plants, such as ageing management, 
configuration control, predictive maintenance, etc. 
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The Regulatory frameworks for long-term operation (LTO) differ from 
country to country in accordance with the licensing system. In countries where the 
operational license is granted for a well-defined operational lifetime, a formal license 
renewal is practiced. In some countries the utilities have a license renewal for 20 
years. Some other Member States have just started the development of regulations for 
license renewal and project planning. In the countries where the operational lifetime is 
not limited by license, the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) is frequently chosen as the 
regulatory tool for an LTO, but in a ten-year framework only. 
 
However, despite of the differences that affect the regulatory strategy in the 
countries and the consequent differences in the application/approval process for LTO, 
the main technical components of the LTO programmes and their basic technical tasks 
are shared among most of the countries. 
 
A general approach to LTO, independent of the regulatory framework, can be 
based upon the following assumptions: 
1. Separation of “pre-conditions to LTO” and “LTO specific” tasks; 
2. Separation between regulatory issues (PLEX, PSR, PLIM, etc.), 
technological issues (degradation) and economical issues; 
3. Clarification of the LTO scope and objectives, and therefore of the 
interfaces between maintenance, ISI, AMP, etc.; 
4. Analysis of the differences between active and passive SSCs, replaceable 
and non-replaceable components. 
 
This approach leads to the following definitions: 
1. Preconditions for LTO: tasks needed to reach the required level of plant safety 
and to prove it. Required also for current operation during design life (see for 
example the safety factors of the PSR). They may include the following 
actions/programmes: 
 Keeping the Safety Analysis Report updated;  
 Keeping the Equipment Qualification updated; 
 Keeping the design basis updated; 
 Update the External Event hazard; 
 Update the safety analysis;  
 Appropriate maintenance programme, with monitoring of its 
effectiveness and trending features in time; 
 Plant radiological risk assessment; 
 Integrated Plant Assessment aspects relevant to safety; 
 Plant Modifications Analysis; 
 etc. 
 
2. LTO specific tasks: tasks needed to maintain the required level of plant safety 
in the long term in relation to material ageing, technological obsolescence and 
staff knowledge, beyond the plant life defined at the design phase by the 
technological limits. They are affected by the extension of the beyond design 
basis lifetime. They may include the following actions/programmes: 
 Trend analysis of material and component degradation; 
 Time Limited Ageing Analysis aspects relevant to nuclear safety; 
 Management of the staff ageing; 
 Management of the long term technological obsolescence of SSCs; 
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 Public acceptance; 
 Environmental issues (population, installations, emergency planning); 
 etc. 
 
Prior to giving consideration to long-term operation, it is essential to check 
that the plant has been maintaining an acceptable safety level of the operation 
(“preconditions”). In particular, the review of the maintenance programme (MS&I) 
and of the ageing management programme (AMP), which in many countries includes 
maintenance, should be conducted, in order to check if the trend analysis is adequate 
to support a decision on the long term. An essential element of the LTO programme is 
the extrapolation of the detected degradation on the planned operational lifespan. The 
licensee should demonstrate that for the extended operational lifetime: 
1. The safety and ageing analysis remain valid and could be projected to the 
end of intended operational lifetime; 
2. The effects of ageing on the intended function(s) will be adequately 
managed; 
3. There is a mechanism to deal with unexpected ageing mechanisms that can 
surface. 
 
In many cases, the plant existing maintenance and ageing management 
programmes can be credited as acceptable programmes for the long-term operation. 
For the remaining cases, either the plant existing programme can be augmented to 
satisfy the listed above attributes or new programmes should be initiated. 
 
The results of the trend analysis should be evaluated considering the 
following: 
 The entity of life time extension; 
 Time required to implement corrective actions; 
 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) application; 
 Expert judgment (risk is often subjective). 
 
One of the following strategies can be implemented in case of non-compliant 
items: 
 Replacing or restoring the component; 
 Changing the operational conditions and/or improving ISI; 
 Developing additional analyses (eliminating initial conservatism with more 
refined methods); 
 Performing a re-evaluation test (with improved qualification methodologies). 
 
In fact beyond design life the design safety margin can be maintained through 
accommodation of the new issues into the design conservatism, sometimes built up 
with rough design methods, conservative environmental conditions and conservative 
operation assumptions. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 MS&I in PLEX 
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It appears that suitable maintenance programmes are one of the most important  
pillars of the LTO programmes; many Countries decided to modify their maintenance 
programmes as a precondition for LTO. 
 
All Countries implementing an LTO programme applied extensive 
modifications to their requirements on maintenance at first step, setting up 
mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of the maintenance activities. In general the 
engineering community believes that the maintenance programme should have 
specific attributes in order to support a long-term operation (LTO) programme for the 
plant. More specifically, the maintenance programmes based on standard preventive 
maintenance (time based), not oriented to the monitoring of its effectiveness, are not 
considered suitable to support the LTO programmes. Crucial attributes for 
maintenance programmes in order to support LTO are considered: the verification of 
the performance goals, the root cause analysis of failures, the feedback from 
maintenance to the ISI programme, the feedback on the OLC, etc. 
 
In particular, the following features are believed to be indispensable for a 
state-of-the-art maintenance programme, even if the LTO process is not urgent in the 
Country: 
1. Monitor the performance of the SSCs which may have impact on safety 
during all operational statuses of the plants; 
2. Assess and manage the risk that may result from the proposed maintenance 
activities in terms of planning, prioritisation, and scheduling. 
 
Therefore, systematic approach to the improvement of the maintenance 
effectiveness is a generic tendency in Countries where LTO programmes are in place; 
however, the progress in this field depends on both the maturity of LTO project and 
on the specific regulatory framework. 
 
In some countries requirements exist on the evaluation of efficiency of the 
maintenance with respect to safety criteria (Maintenance Rule, MR). In these 
countries the utilities have to develop and implement systematic approach to the 
planning, performing and evaluation of the maintenance in response to the MR. A 
common example of the proof of efficiency of the repair work is for example the leak-
test and/or function test. The key aspect is the integration of existing programmes 
such as: ISI and monitoring, trending, maintenance, replacement, to ensure a long 
term plant operation. 
 
In this sense the experience of the USA, Spain, Hungary, Finland and other 
countries with an LTO programme in place are a confirmation of this generic 
statement: all these countries modified their regulatory requirements on maintenance, 
in the direction mentioned above, as one of the preconditions for the LTO of their 
plants. Therefore the analysis of these LTO programmes becomes essential to 
understand the requirements on the state-of-the-art maintenance programmes posed 
by the International Community.  
 
More details are provided in the following on the position developed at the 
IAEA, in Spain, Finland and in the USA, for reference. 
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2.2.2 Ageing management in PLEX 
 
In general, ageing management is addressed in procedures for maintenance, 
surveillance, in service inspection programme, etc. as one of the irreversible physical 
degradation processes, which could lead to failure. The operating experience shows 
that active and short-lived SSC are in general addressed by existing maintenance 
programmes. Conversely, the performance and safety margins of the passive long-
lived SSC are assumed to be guaranteed by design. However, the analysis of the 
operating experience showed that unforeseen ageing phenomena may occur either 
because of shortcomings in design, manufacturing or by operating errors. Therefore 
the implementation of an AMP and a predictive MS&I programme is definitely a 
condition for the operation within the limits of design or licensed lifetime and is a pre-
condition for an LTO as well. Moreover, the ageing management is intended to 
provide a crosscutting connection among all maintenance and inspection activities 
carried out on active components also, to provide a unified understanding and 
treatment of the degradation phenomena. In conclusion, both the AMP and MS&I 
programmes could be accepted if the following actions are completed: 
 Programme scope is defined; 
 Preventive actions are developed; 
 Parameters to be monitored or inspected are detected; 
 Detection of ageing effects is ensured; 
 Monitoring and trending is performed; 
 Acceptance criteria are defined; 
 Corrective actions confirmation process are defined; 
 Administrative control is fixed; 
 Operating experience of the programme is considered. 
 
Some of these attributes are inter-related. Particularly the frequency, the 
trending and the number of locations to be monitored may reflect the operating 
experience from past operation.  
 
3 PLIM Scope - Component classification 
3.1 The Finnish model (VVER) 
According to the experience at the Loviisa plant [24], all structures, systems 
and components at the plant, regardless of their safety relevance, should be covered 
by such classification. A suitable grading of measures may be applied and therefore 
different levels of MS&I and AMP, economic analysis etc. may be assigned. 
 
The model (see also Fig.1 from [24]) groups different classes as in the following: 
• Class A: critical components and structures directly limiting the plant life with 
their availability/integrity, non replaceable. Example: reactor pressure vessel, 
steam generator, pressurizer, main coolant pump, containment structures. 
Example of MS&I strategy: full scope monitoring and analysis of the 
degradation; 
• Class B: critical components, systems and structures from the standpoint of 
their importance to safety and their cost of replacement/reparation. Examples: 
primary circuit, high and low pressure safety injection systems, feed water 
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system, condensers, turbine, generators, Diesels. Example of MS&I strategy: 
condition based MS&I; 
• Class C: sensitive components, systems and structures. Examples: nuclear 
intermediate cooling, sprinkler, drainage and vents, main steam line, residual 
heat removal, circulating and service water systems, condenser cooling 
system. Example of MS&I strategy: preventive (time-based) MS&I; 
• Class D: other components and structures. Example: condenser purification 
system, auxiliary boiler plant, drinking water supply, sewerage. Example of 
MS&I strategy: run-to-failure. 
 
It is noted that such approach is still quite heterogeneous, as it mixes up 
components, systems and special equipment. Therefore the proposed classification 
may be reviewed to provide a more homogeneous approach that would make the 
interfaces with the maintenance classification or spare part classification much easier 
and traceable, because more homogeneous. 
 
For components in classes A,B,C, a sort of component "health certificate" is 
recommended for continuous review and upgrading by the system engineers. The 
certificate should make reference to the design basis and should collect the results 
from the AMP, the operation ad the ISI programs, including the pending issues 
detected by previous tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Proposal for PLIM oriented component classification 
 
3.2 The Spanish model 
The Spanish approach to PLIM follows closely the US regulation, as stated in 
the 10CFR54 [25] Code. In its compulsory part ageing management is applied to both 
active and passive components; however it is the Component Reliability program [1] 
that addresses Maintenance, ISI and Ageing evaluation under a single integrated 
program (see Fig.2). 
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Fig.2 – Summary of the Spanish approach to PLIM and to component screening. 
 
 
3.3 The Romanian model (CANDU Plant) 
The Romanian model is discussed in the following and it represents a 
consistent application of a generic approach to a CANDU type plant [10]. 
 
The AMP scoping process goes through a systematic application of a number 
of criteria, as summarized in Fig. 3 
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Fig. 3 – Summary of the procedure developed at Cernavoda NPP for PLIM and for 
component screening. 
 
In particular the screening process relies on the following criteria: 
 
Level 1 of application of PLIM – Life limiting SSCs, those SSC for which: 
 it must be assured their integrity and functional capabilities during operating 
life and while in shutdown states; 
 there is no replacement possibility; 
 it’s estimated a total control over plant life; 
 Life Assessment analyses, or a Life Cycle Management plan must be 
realized. 
 
Level 2 of application of PLIM – Critical SSCs, those SSC for which: 
 it must be assured their integrity and functional capabilities during the 
operating life and while in shutdown states; 
 it is extremely difficult to replace them; 
 there are estimated high costs, long terms operation in shutdown state, 
radiation exposure significant risk; 
 Life Assessment analyses or Systematic Assessment of Maintenance studies 
must be realized. 
 
Level 3 of application of PLIM – Important SSCs, those SSCs for which 
 there is the possibility of their replacement in an orderly manner; 
 the programs of preventive maintenance, in-service inspection and 
components status/surveillance evaluation are applicable; 
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 it must be realized Systematic Assessment of Maintenance (for structures and 
components) and a Life Cycle Management program (for systems), both used 
in plant condition evaluation. 
 
Level 4 of application of PLIM – Not important SSCs, those SSCs for which 
 could represent a residual risk for Ageing Management Review analyses; 
 have support functions for safety related SSC; 
 can be periodically replaced without difficulty; 
 are subjected to the preventive maintenance, in-service inspection and 
assessment/surveillance programs prescriptions for components 
 
The full-scope application of PLIM in view of the PLEX program envisages 
the following: 
• Evaluation of the Actual plant condition, including: 
 ∗ Technical aspects overview and tasks schedules of PLEX project. 
 ∗ Existing environmental operating conditions. 
 ∗ Details on environment components affected by wastes and toxic and 
dangerous materials. 
 ∗ Time limited ageing analyses (TLAA) descriptions required for degradation 
evaluation: 
 – TLAA analyses (pressurizer, reactor inlet header, pressure 
tube and calandria vessel) 
 – Industrial experience 
 – Methods and models of probabilistic assessment (PSA, PRA) 
 – Nuclear specific civil-work experience 
 ∗ Plant condition assessment after 30 years of operation: Buildings and 
Structures, Reactor and Mechanical systems, Electrical and I&C systems. 
 
 
The flow chart is shown in Fig.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – The screening process applied at Cernavoda [10] 
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The outcome of this process is the following list of life-limiting components, for 
which the PLIM model is applied in the different levels:  
Level 1 SSCs  
∗  Calandria vessel 
∗  ESCS components 
∗  Calandria tubes 
∗  In-core Reactivity Mechanism Control components 
∗  MMS pipe spools inside calandria vault 
∗  Containment and  essential internal structures 
Level 2 SSCs  
∗ PHTS equipment and pipes 
∗  Pressure Tubes 
∗  Steam Generators 
∗  PHTS pumps 
∗  PHTS feeders 
∗ ECCS pipes and equipment 
∗  SDCS pipes and equipment 
∗  MMS pumps and heat exchangers 
∗  Special safety systems 
∗  Structures with essential or safety related functions 
∗  High capacity heat exchangers 
∗  Others SSC in a variable number (10 - 20) 
Level 3 SSCs 
∗ ESCS pipes and equipment 
∗  Calandria vault cooling system components 
∗  PHTS feed system pumps 
∗  Turbine-Generator system 
∗  Service water systems pipes and equipment 
∗  BFWS pipes and equipment 
∗  Medium and low capacity heat exchangers 
∗  Diesel generators 
∗  Power supply and distribution systems 
∗  Battery cells system 
Level 4 SSCs  
∗ Compressors and compressed air system components 
∗  Instrument air system 
∗  D2O vapour recovery dryers 
∗  Air exhaust system fans 
∗  Transformers 
∗  Power cables and I&C systems 
 
The application of the above mentioned criteria to structures and buildings 
may lead to the following actions: 
–  intermediate wastes storage facility extension 
–  metal and concrete structures repairs 
–  coatings and epoxy liner partial replacement and repairs  
–  bays metallic plate coating 
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–  furnishing elements replacement 
–  walls and floors finishing replacement and repairs 
–  floors elements replacement and repairs 
–  Rompan walls replacement and repair 
–  covers replacement and repair  
and to the following costs 
• Human effort: 350 m x h 
• Estimated period: 2.5 y 
• Conventional wastes: 930 t 
• Radioactive wastes: 410 t 
 
The application of the above mentioned criteria to the reactor and mechanical 
systems may lead to a number of actions on the following systems (taken from the 
experience in Cernavoda): 
–  Mechanical absorber units 
–  Adjuster units 
–  Liquid zone control units 
–  Liquid injection shutdown units 
–  Ion chamber casings 
–  Calandria vessel assembly 
–  Flux detector units 
–  ESCS system 
–  Pressure tubes 
–  PHTS feeders 
–  Pressurizer 
–  Steam Generator 
–  SDCS heat exchanger 
–  Instrument air system 
–  PHTS purification inter-cooler 
–  PHTS purification heat exchanger 
–  Primary circuit 
–  Shutdown cooling system 
–  PHTS purification system 
–  MMS heat exchanger 
–  F/M head 
–  F/M auxiliary ports 
–  F/M auxiliary and support systems 
–  Spent fuel transfer and storage system 
–  Main steam system 
–  Service water systems (RCW,RSW) 
–  Spent fuel bay vent system 
–  Reactor building vent system 
–  Local air coolers system 
And to the following costs 
• Average human effort: 
• 468 m x month 
• Low and medium radwastes: 2980 t 
 
• Conventional wastes: 2441 t 
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In the experience of Cernavoda, the application of the above mentioned 
criteria to the turbine and generators led to the following costs: 
• Human effort: 72-90 m x month 
• Estimated period: 1.8 y 
• Conventional wastes: 160-190 t 
 
According to the experience in Cernavoda, the overall amount of resources 
involved can be summarised as in the following: 
 Estimated average duration of reactor systems refurbishment is approx. 30 
months. 
 Estimated average duration of turbine-generator refurbishment is approx. 20 
months. 
 Estimated average duration of steam generators repairs is approx. 30 months. 
 Estimated average duration of structures and buildings repairs is approx. 30 
months, if work conditionings are foreseen. 
 Spent fuel bay metallic plate coating can not be started earlier than 2 years 
from the plant shutdown and fuel transfer to intermediate spent fuel storage 
facility. 
 Estimated total duration of plant life extension project is between 4 ÷ 5 years, 
including plant commissioning and grid connection phases. 
 Expected maximum human effort during development of plant life extension 
project is between   2200 ÷ 3100 m x month. 
 Estimated maximum wastes quantities vary between 3427 t and 3725 t (low 
and medium radioactive wastes) and between 2929,2 t and 3662 t 
(conventional wastes). 
 
 
4 The Ageing Management Program for selected SSCs 
4.1 NDE issues 
The Ageing Management Program (AMP) aims at the evaluation of the 
component degradation, based upon the results of inspections and analyses. The NDE 
program plays a crucial role to the AMP. Based on the state-of-the-art practice, some 
considerations are collected in the following on the capabilities of modern NDE to 
support AMP. 
 
Some recent surveys of the reliability of modern NDE techniques [26] 
highlighted the following:  
 
(1) Some plants show very complex inspection works at areas not covered by 
inspections in similar plants in other Countries. Examples are the baffle bolts 
at Loviisa, and the vessel head (the welding around the penetrations of the 
CRDM) in South Ukraine. This fact raises the issue for a better 
communication among plants, for a systematic collection and redistribution of 
the feedback of operating experience, in the interest of safety. 
 
(2) The importance of qualified ISI systems, inspired for example to the ENIQ 
model, is generally recognised. Qualification costs are in Europe too high and 
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harmonisation of the national practice would bring enormous benefit to the 
industry, saving costs and guaranteeing a uniform level of reliability 
throughout the European Commission. 
 
(3) Repair techniques are becoming very important: the qualification of the 
durability of the repair in some cases is difficult. 
 
(4) Risk informed ISI (applied to all safety related components and piping) and in 
general PSA applications represent natural evolution of the traditional 
approach. However, still not too much practice was accumulated in Europe 
and guidelines would be welcomed. In addition, emphasis has to be given to 
the quality of the PSA studies supporting such applications (the TECDOCs of 
the IAEA are of great help to this concern). 
 
(5) The evaluation of the component reliability values as function of the MS&I 
system is still a challenge and additional R&D should be developed, also to 
cover the structure of the databases where similar data can be processed. 
 
In conclusions, and according to [26], flaw detection by available NDE 
techniques still are very much influenced by the orientation of the probe and the 
defect, by the stress orthogonal to the flaw, by the hysteretic effects due to the crack 
closure and re-opening. Therefore NDE is still very much skill and experience 
dependent and the strategy, also drawn by ENIQ [27], of a full integration and 
assessment of process, technology and personnel is very up-to-date.   
 
All NDE models still have troubles in capturing the "anomalous" behaviours 
triggered by construction and mounting, as they refer to the "ideal" design case.  
The experience in recent years showed that the NDE programs are still too much 
oriented to capture defects which are expected in terms of generation, location and 
size. All recently discovered ageing mechanisms were not detected by NDEs (either 
because not included in the inspection programs or because not requested by the 
codes), but by failures (a new one every 7 years in average). Therefore many 
scientists emphasise the idea of developing "proactive" NDE plans, able to "detect the 
unexpected", improving the concept of NDE effectiveness and fostering the concept 
of on-line monitoring and RI-ISI to try to capture unexpected degradation 
mechanisms. 
 
The following measures have been taken to support optimal NDE programs in 
new plants: fewer welds in critical areas, use of degradation resistant materials, 
provide good access for inspection, design welds for inspection in components that 
need to be inspected, prepare ID and OD at best, use on-line monitoring, build self-
monitoring systems, do performance demonstration before construction. 
4.2 AMPs for concrete structures 
Nuclear power plant operators have recognized many challenges to 
maintenance, repair and more in general for PLEX in relation to concrete structures. 
One of these is the ability to detect and predict the extent of internal damage and 
ageing effects. Modern NDE methods and instrumentation are thought to provide 
potentially useful techniques for the detection and measurement of the extent of 
internal damage and provide information on the construction quality. However, still a 
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lack of consolidated experience affects the reliability of the AMP for concrete 
structures. 
 
Moreover, despite of the large choice of inspection techniques available, the 
engineering community still employs different practices in the management of 
concrete ageing, especially in the use of ISI, their integration with the safety 
assessment and their optimization. This issue has become urgent in recent years, when 
the degradation mechanisms affecting concrete structures have shown their potential 
to jeopardize structural reliability, thereby challenging the safety of the installation. 
 
The international community (see for example [26]) considers that there is a 
need to ensure that the methods used for the inspection and monitoring of safety 
critical containment structures are reliable and that their capabilities and limitations 
are properly understood. In particular, the main issue seems to be related to the 
determination of which additional information is needed to assure that non-readily 
replaceable components and structures (e.g., concrete structures) will retain their 
integrity and reliability during their projected years of service. 
 
The following notes summarize the state-of-the-art practice to this concern: 
 
1. Concrete structures are plant life limiting, being mostly irreplaceable. Therefore 
PLIM should address safety, durability and cost control at the same time. Broad 
choice of techniques are now available for monitoring and a PLIM program is 
feasible 
 
2. Two technical objectives for PLIM of concrete structures should be considered: 
• Monitor degradation, for durability and planning covering the whole life, 
from design to construction and operation 
• Proof safety (leaktightness, integrity), even in absence of visually evident 
degradation  
 
3. Especially for new reactors durability is considered since the design phase (either 
implicitly, through prescriptions on water content, concrete cover, etc. or 
explicitly) 
 
4. New types of instrumentation (vibrating wire strain gauges and fibre optic 
sensors) have been used together with real time monitoring  
 
5. Monitoring from short and long term purposes may be different and needs 
optimization since the design stage 
 
6. Environmental variables: they are crucial in driving the degradation and should be 
carefully monitored 
 
7. ISI results and design data need well designed IT tools to support any PLIM 
evaluation and optimization of ISI, maintenance, and repair 
 
8. A global correlation between overall strain field and leak rate is now possible, 
provided creep effects are screened out 
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9. Most of leak rate is still concentrated around penetrations, gaskets, discontinuities 
 
10. Liner configuration, behavior and repair technology may deeply affect leak rate 
 
Despite of the good understanding of concrete degradation mechanisms and of 
the large availability of ISI techniques, few steps are still needed to close the gaps to 
comprehensive ageing management programs:  
1. Which degradation mechanisms are the most relevant to safety (and should 
be considered since the design stage)? At which locations?  
– The environmental stressors may be crucial for such choice and 
adequate monitoring should be suggested.  
– Compilation of material property data for long-term performance (also 
at elevated temperature and radiation) and trending, evaluation of 
environmental effects and assessment and validation of non-destructive 
evaluation methods. 
2. Which ISI techniques are the most suitable to monitor degradation? At which 
locations? At which time interval? Which cost benefit? (Reference to 
technology, procedure and personnel) 
– A safety case with a sample AMP plan may be useful (on shut-down 
plants?).  
– Risk-informed approaches may provide a useful framework, as 
“monitoring for everything” is neither feasible nor cost effective. 
Include provisions for “detecting the unknown”.  
– Non-destructive methods for thick-walled, heavily reinforced concrete 
structures and basements may be improved. Round robin may be 
beneficial 
– Personnel training and qualification guidelines (the “metal” world 
covers it already) 
3. How to correlate ISI and monitoring result to containment fragility?  
– Improved constitutive/damage models and acceptance criteria for use 
in assessments of current as well as estimating the future condition of 
structures 
4. How to repair?  
– Data on application and performance of repair materials and 
techniques should be collected  
 
5 Management issues 
Organisational aspects in Maintenance and ISI are more and more important: a 
better control of subcontractors is needed in countries where 80% of MS&I tasks are 
contracted to external companies, as compared to the past tradition in Central Europe, 
where only 10% was contracted. The type of contracts for ISI, qualification of 
contractor personnel and the ownership of the qualification dossier (i.e. either the 
plant or the contractor) need homogenisation in Europe.  
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The main issues behind such needs seem to be the management of 
maintenance contractors, including good practice on qualification of suppliers, the 
contract management (long term contract, training included, etc.), the availability of 
contractors in the long term, the strategic alliances with contractors, the contractor 
qualification and audit. 
 
However, there is still workshop highlighted that there is still a big gap 
between Western European Nuclear Utilities and some Eastern European ones in the 
field of the maintenance management. In particular, very few show structured 
maintenance optimization systems in place, network to share spare parts, reliable 
control of the supplemental workers (more and more used), integration with the asset 
management of the plants, proper set of maintenance effectiveness indicators. 
 
These delays in adopting robust modern techniques for plant life management 
as a whole make the outages still long, and the overall management of the plant asset 
far from optimized. 
 
5.1 Summary of the questionnaire 
 
Not all Countries/Utilities have a Human factor control program for 
maintenance and ISI; in most Countries, the issue of the HF has been implicitly 
addressed through improved techniques (better planning, automated welding, IGSCC 
control, RI-ISI, RCM, etc.) and better work control. 
 
In relation to the number of contractors/workers involved (average per Unit), 
results are summarised in the following table 1. 
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Table 1 – Summary table on the questionnaire outcome  
 
Country # contractors 
involved in 
maintenance 
# workers at 
the plant 
during 
maintenance 
# plant 
workers 
LT 6 100 0 
H 0 600  
UKR 0 600  
UKR 7 340 50 
BG 8   
RO 170 100  
SK 19 270 625 
ARM 6 600  
RF 200 870 30% 
CZ 35 1400 60 
 
In relation to the incidence of human factors on operational events, the following two 
examples looked informative: 
In Romania  
• out of 2471 events (2006), 9% are HF related 
• out of 2682 events (2007), 7% are HF related 
In Armenia 
• 17% are HF related 
 
The most widely used indicators of maintenance effectiveness are the following: 
• Failure rates 
• Generic safety indicators 
• Control of loose parts 
• Percentage of rework 
• N. of claims 
• Repeated Maintenance 
• Time/task 
• N. of unplanned work orders 
• Etc. 
According to the sole Czech experience [10], a special set of indicators was 
developed: 
 Work conformance to specifications 
 Delivery schedule to plan 
 Work to agreed cost 
 Response/reaction time, for Single/Project 
 Quality of performance, for Frame work contracts 
 Workforce utilisation 
 Safety (number of accidents, lost time injury (LTI), rate of absenteeism, etc.) 
 
The survey highlighted the following preventive/corrective actions implemented in 
relation to the above mentioned indicators: 
• Training and re-training 
• Supervision 
• Access control 
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• Improved work procedures 
• Detailed work planning 
• Use of Simulator 
• No-blame culture 
• Improved labelling 
• Etc. 
 
In relation to the practice on contractors' management, the questionnaire highlighted 
the following: 
• The average length of the contracts is 2-4 years 
• In some cases, a general contractor is identified and encouraged as a practice 
• Contractor training is not always organised by the Licensee 
• Contractor qualification could well be from foreign Bodies, and ISO 
 
5.2 Work control 
 
In many Countries the procedures for work control are quite stringent, also in 
consideration of the growing involvement of supplemental workers that requires even 
more stringent procedures (see previous chapters). 
 
A key role in the work control is played by the maintenance manager, which 
has very well defined functions in all Countries. An example of such functions is 
summarized in the following from the European experience [4]: 
1. Technical mission: anticipate and control the technical risks, capitalizing the 
experience, manage the OLC margins without reducing the safety (through 
changing inspection intervals, etc.), is ready with contingency plans 
2. Team management: managing competences, managing staff ageing and 
knowledge management, control of contractors experience (+ licensing and 
training), monitoring the contractors, check the safety culture, carry out 
effective communication 
3. Economic management: undertaking the overall objective (deciding the 
overall strategy on cost, availability, etc.), manage the maintenance  
optimization, decide the subcontracting policy and the type of contracts, 
appoint the appropriate staff number and competences, manages the 
connection with the ISI team  
 
A very urgent issue, as raised by all the Countries involved in the research, is 
the control of supplemental workers, which poses new concerns, particularly in the 
new European Member Countries, traditionally used to employ large numbers of 
maintenance staff. The issue is addressed in the following chapters.  
 
5.3 Roles and responsibilities 
 
The PLIM program requires important changes in the traditional plant 
organisation. In particular, the following preparatory organizational tasks should be 
implemented: 
 
– Development of a PLIM supervision and coordination Unit 
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– Nomination of System Engineers, full time in charge of selected systems, 
especially for Class A or Class 1 for CANDU-6 power plants 
– Identification of research and engineering specialists in different disciplines 
at the TSO organisation, ready to cooperate with the system engineers to 
address methodological issues, interpretation of results, interfaces with the 
scientific and engineering community, etc. 
 
The identification of System engineers (typically 10-15 people for two power 
units) in the typical Technology Unit at a plant is considered an important 
contribution to a good PLIM implementation. They are responsible for the life 
management of a particular system, structure or component. They represent the 
system "owners". These engineers are responsible for the following tasks: 
 
• Preparation and control of inspection, monitoring and maintenance 
activities related to life management of systems, structures and 
components critical to safety 
• Detection and assessment of aging  mechanisms and effects 
• Preparation and implementation of improvements in the field of proactive 
maintenance. 
• Maintain and populate the life management system  
• Update the information in the long range planning system  
• Keep updated the records of the component/system health status in the 
reference documentation system 
• Guarantee the reporting 
 
Some interfaces between the system engineers and other groups/depts. are 
particularly important in the PLIM framework, namely: 
1. The operators: plant TS and OLC may be discussed and changed (with the due 
authorizations) as a consequence of detailed analysis of the operating 
experience and of the MS&I outcome. 
2. The MS&I technicians: objectives, periodicity, scope and other attributes of 
the programs may be agreed and modified 
3. The Safety specialists (either on site or at the TSO): they own the plant safety 
analysis and therefore all the acceptance criteria for ageing and degradation 
should be agreed and reviewed with them 
4. The technical support group: the decision to repair/replace/maintain a 
component or structure is taken jointly and approved by the management 
group of the PLIM. 
 
5.4 Work process 
 
Work planning and control should be defined in the relevant procedures. One 
example is shown in Fig.5 [5].  
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Work Request,
Scheduled
Maintenance Task
Process Isolation
Maintenance
Supervisor Work
Permit
Work Preliminary
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Work Permit
Work OrderWork Scheduding
Work Permits 
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Work Completed
Operational
Test Run
Work Feedback
Work Execution
 
Figure 5 - Work planning and control procedures 
 
This process is typically fully computerized in a maintenance information 
management system. These systems typically consist of the following modules: 
• Work management  
• Service management 
• Contract management 
• Materials management 
• Procurement management 
• Asset management 
A very sensitive issue is represented by the work control, more and more 
relevant in a very competitive market of suppliers and in regimes of growing 
subcontracting by the European plants. To this extent, some measures can be applied: 
– Involvement of subcontractors in yearly meetings, with detailed analysis of 
the follow-up from maintenance, with recording of their performance in 
special dedicated records 
 
– Involvement of the subcontractors in training initiatives, to assure the perfect 
alignment of competences 
 
– Preference for long term (3-4 years) contracting, which provides better 
guarantees to the contractors, improving the mutual confidence and 
encouraging the contractor to invest in training of its personnel 
 
– Stringent assessment of the qualification of the single staff member of the 
contractor, on a yearly basis 
 
– Audits at the suppliers site on their quality system.  
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In general the influence of human errors in the failure rates is very high: 
measures should be taken to minimize such contribution (from both staff and 
contractors). Detailed recommendations are available in [28].  
 
The quality of the maintenance tasks should be subjected to stringent QA 
requirements. In particular, post maintenance quality inspectors, calibration 
specialists, tagging controllers and auditors should not be hierarchically connected 
with the maintenance teams who implement the job. 
5.5 Spare parts: networks and policies 
 
The management of the spare parts is a crucial contributor to the PLIM and 
to its optimization. The availability of spare parts for every critical SSC should be 
agreed between the managers of the warehouse, the system engineers and the 
maintenance engineers. 
 
Possibly, networks for spare parts should be settled between similar plants, 
even in different countries. 
 
The stocks of spare parts should be properly modeled in the economic 
planning, at least for the foreseen period of plant operation, including depreciation 
factors as function of time and environmental conditions. 
 
In case of lack of suppliers, the system engineers should recover the design 
basis and identify equivalent parts, to be further agreed with the maintenance 
engineers. 
  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The research on PLIM models developed at the JRC identified some areas 
where some R&D effort is needed to support the development of original PLIM 
models, integrated with maintenance optimization programs. 
 
 The research concluded that there is a potential, very important role for the IE 
network on safe operation of nuclear installation (in the research field) in the 
coordination of the efforts among the European Countries to promote a full 
implementation of maintenance optimization programs and PLIM, especially in the 
framework of PLEX.  
 
 Therefore the research refined the first proposal for a PLIM model completed 
in 2007 and took the best practice of the European Countries, integrating both safety 
and economic aspects in a global optimization effort. 
 
 The reason to keep the R&D effort at the European level is clear: the 
implementation of PLIM methods requires the availability of component data, well 
established probabilistic techniques of appropriate quality etc. that cannot be 
developed at the Country level only. In this framework, any future action in the 
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EU/FP7 would be most probably very welcomed and will provide concrete support to 
the enhancement of the safety of the European Plants. 
 
The next steps of the research will address the following priorities in relation 
to PLIM 
1. PLIM processes: interfaces between plant programs and asset management 
2. Classification of SSCs in relation to PLIM and interfaces with other 
classification approaches at the plant (safety, maintenance, ISI, etc.) 
3. PLIM organizational structures 
4. Interfaces between PLIM and spare part managements: relevant models, 
including obsolescence effects 
5. Financial modeling to optimize resources in the long term 
6. Integration between maintenance strategy and generic PLIM experience on 
component reliability (AMP), failure rates, performance, etc.  
7. Develop models for interaction between PLIM and PSA (safety analysis in 
general), especially during shutdown modes, for optimal outage planning. 
 
and the following priorities in relation to MS&I 
8. Comparison of SFW for M optimization 
9. Maintenance effectiveness indicators: their acceptance level and corrective 
actions to be taken for each of them. Study the combination of indicators and 
their potential interaction. 
10. Collection of potential degradation mechanisms, acceptance criteria and trend 
curves for the most common and sensitive European components 
11. Human factors reduction 
12. Conditions for on-line maintenance 
13. Simulation tools for M opt: they may save time in the planning! 
 
The research will continue in the year 2009 with a robust validation and 
improvement of the proposed model at real plants. 
 
 
7 References 
 
[1] INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, Equipment Reliability 
Process Description, INPO AP-913, Atlanta, 2004  
[2] EUR 22603 EN, P.Contri, Summary report on the workshop “Maintenance rules: 
improving maintenance effectiveness”, Petten, 2006 
[3] EUR 22604 EN, V.Ranguelova, P.Contri, I.Kouzmina, Summary report on the 
Workshop on “Advanced Methods for Safety Assessment and Optimization of 
NPP Maintenance” Petten, 2006 
[4] EUR 21903 EN: “Optimization of Maintenance Programmes at NPPs - 
Benchmarking study on implemented organizational Schemes, Advanced Methods 
and Strategies for Maintenance Optimization - Summary Report”, January 2006. 
[5] EUR 23232, P.Contri et al., "A plant life management model including optimized 
MS&I program –Safety and economic issues", JRC-IE 2007 
[6] Fifth Steering Committee Meeting (2008) of the “SENUF Network” – Technical 
and planning meeting with the stakeholders, 2008, Petten 
[7] IAEA and JRC-IE, International Workshop on "Advanced Approaches to In-
Service Inspection, Maintenance and Repair", Zagreb, Inetec, May 4-9, 2008 
Report EUR-23720 EN 
2008/11 
 
 
33 
[8] OECD/NEA/CSNI and JRC-IE, Workshop on "Ageing Management of Thick-
Walled Concrete Structures, including In-Service Inspections, Maintenance and 
Repair, Instrumentation Methods and Safety Assessment in view of Long-Term 
Operation”, hosted by the Nuclear Research Institute Rez, 30 September – 3 
October, 2008 
[9] P.Contri et al., “Plant Life Management Models - A comparison with analysis of 
impact on both safety and non-safety issues", 2008 ASME Pressure Vessel and 
Piping Conference, Chicago, 27-31 July, 2008 
[10] JRC-IE, Workshop on "Optimisation of maintenance programs at NPPs with 
consideration of safety and economical aspects", Petten, November 13-14, 2008 
[11] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Technical Report Series 
448, Plant Life Management for Long Term Operation of Light Water Reactors, 
IAEA, Vienna (2006).  
[12] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants: Operation Requirements, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, IAEA, 
Vienna (2000).  
[13] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Maintenance, Surveillance 
and In-Service Inspection in Nuclear Power Plants; Safety Guide, Safety 
Standards Series No. NS-G-2.6, IAEA, Vienna (2002). 
[14] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Assessment and 
Verification for Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide, Safety Standards Series 
No. NS-G-1.2, IAEA, Vienna (2002). 
[15] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Management of Life 
Cycle and Ageing at Nuclear Power Plants: Improved I&C Maintenance; IAEA-
TECDOC-1402, IAEA, Vienna (2004). 
[16] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidance for Optimizing 
Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Programmes; IAEA-TECDOC-1383, IAEA, 
Vienna (2004). 
[17] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Applications of 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA-
TECDOC-1200, IAEA, Vienna (2001). 
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Technologies for 
Improving Current and Future Light Water Reactor Operation and Maintenance: 
Development on the Basis of Experience; IAEA-TECDOC-1175, IAEA, Vienna 
(2000). 
[19] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Advances in Safety 
Related Maintenance; IAEA-TECDOC-1138, IAEA, Vienna (2000). 
[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory Surveillance 
of Safety Related Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants; IAEA-TECDOC-960, 
IAEA, Vienna (1997). 
[21] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Good Practices for Cost 
Effective Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants; IAEA-TECDOC-928, IAEA, 
Vienna (1997). 
[22] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Related 
Maintenance in the Framework of the Reliability Centred Maintenance Concept; 
IAEA-TECDOC-658, IAEA, Vienna (1992) 
[23] S.Doctor, "Recent developments in NDE technologies", Proceedings of the 
2008 ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, Chicago, 27-31 July, 2008 
[24] Makela K. et al., Technical Documentation developed for the JRC-IE Technical 
Meeting, 15/12/2007 
Report EUR-23720 EN 
2008/11 
 
 
34 
[25] US Regulations, 10CFR50 Code for Nuclear Safety 
[26] ASME, Proceedings of the 2008 ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, 
Chicago, 27-31 July, 2008 
[27] http://safelife.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eniq/ 
[28] EUR 23226, G.Manna, Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear 
Installations: Analysis of available models and identification of R&D issues, 
2007, JRC-IE  
 
Report EUR-23720 EN 
2008/11 
 
 
35 
8 List of Abbreviations 
 
ACC   Acceding and Candidate Countries 
AMP   Ageing management program 
CFR   Code of Federal Regulations 
CIS   Commonwealth of Independent States 
CM   Corrective Maintenance 
EPRI   Electric Power Research Institute 
EU   European Union 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
IE   Institute for Energy 
ISI   In-Service Inspection 
I&C   Instrumentation & Control 
LTO   Long Term Operation 
MS&I   Maintenance, Surveillance and Inspection 
NPP   Nuclear Power Plant 
PLEX Plant Life Extension 
PLIM Plant Life Management 
PM   Preventive Maintenance 
PSA   Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PSR   Periodic Safety Review 
RBI   Risk Based Inspection 
RCM   Reliability Centred Maintenance 
RG   Regulatory Guide 
RIM   Risk-Informed Maintenance 
SENUF  Safety of Eastern European Type Nuclear Facilities 
SSC   Systems, Structures and Components 
TS Technical Specifications 
VVER (or WWER) Water-Cooled Water-Moderated Power Reactor 
  
 
European Commission 
 
EUR-23720 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy - SONIS Action n. 52103- 
A plant life management model as support to Plant Life Extension programs of Nuclear 
Installations – Effective integration of the Safety programs into an overall optimization 
of the operating costs.  
Author Paolo Contri – EC/JRC-IE 
 
 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2008 – 33 pp. – 21 x 29.7 cm 
Scientific and Technical Research Series 
ISSN – 1018-5593 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Main objectives of this report, as outcome of the research activities carried out in 
2008 and in previous years by the research network SENUF, are the following: 
4. To collect the experience of the European Countries in the field of Plant Life 
Management (PLIM) and Plant Life Extension (PLEX), seen as two crucial 
programs in safety and cost optimisation at operating plants 
5. To settle a model for PLIM also suitable to support a PLEX program, tailored 
to the European market 
6. To validate the proposed model against the European practice. 
 
The basic goal of PLiM, as it is defined in this research, is to satisfy requirements for 
safe, possibly long-term, supplies of electricity in an economically competitive way. 
The basic goal of the operating companies is to operate as long as economically 
reasonable from the safety point of view. PLiM is a management tool for doing that.  
Therefore PLiM is a system of programmes and procedures developed in many 
Countries, with some differences due to the national framework, to satisfy safety 
requirements for safe operation and for power production in a competitive way in a 
time frame which is rational from both the technical and economical point of view. 
PLiM programmes address both technical and economic issues, as well as knowledge 
management issues. 
 
This report makes reference to the first part of this study that was completed in 2007, 
when a PLIM model was proposed and validated at real Nuclear Power Plants. This 
report adds some important contributions in three areas: definition of the PLIM scope, 
review of the Ageing Management Program for selected structures, management of 
contractors and strategic alliances. These contributions were selected after a thorough 
analysis of the European best practice, also with the contribution of the SENUF 
network Members.  
The validation of the proposed PLIM model, including the improvements described in 
this report, represents only the first step of a more ambitious program of 
validation/improvement that will be implemented in the course of 2009. 
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